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First Japan and more recently China have pursued 
export-oriented growth strategies. While other Asian 
countries have done likewise, Japan and China are of 
particular interest because their economies are so large 
and the size of the associated bilateral trade imbalances 
with the United States so conspicuous. In this paper the 
authors focus on U.S. efforts to restore the reciprocal 
GATT/WTO market-access bargain in the face of 
such large imbalances and the significant spillovers to 
the international trading system. The paper highlights 
similarities and differences in the two cases. The 
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authors describe U.S. attempts to reduce the bilateral 
imbalances through targeted trade policies intended 
to slow growth of U.S. imports from these countries 
or increase growth of U.S. exports to them. They then 
examine how these trade policy responses, as well as U.S. 
efforts to address what were perceived as underlying 
causes of the imbalances, influenced the evolution of the 
international trading system. Finally, the authors compare 
the macroeconomic conditions associated with the 
bilateral trade imbalances and their implications for the 
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1. Introduction 
Japan in the 1950s through the 1990s and China since the late 1970s have followed similar—
and similarly successful—strategies of promoting economic growth through rapid acquisition of 
advanced foreign technology and expansion of manufactured exports. While other Asian 
countries have done likewise, in some cases with exports growing as rapidly and for as long, 
Japan and China have presented special challenges to the GATT/WTO trading system because 
their shares of world exports have been so large and the associated bilateral trade imbalances 
with the United States so conspicuous.  In both political and economic terms, these large 
imbalances seem to contradict the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity, which involves a balance 
of market-access concessions across major players in the system. 
During their respective periods of rapid export growth, Japan and China each accounted 
for a major share of total world exports.  As of 2007, China’s share of world merchandise 
exports had soared to 8.9%, less than Germany’s 9.7% share but topping the U.S. share of 
8.5% as well as Japan’s 5.2%, in each of the latter three cases from a much larger economy 
(WTO 2008b).  Given the sharp drop in global import demand following the 2008 onset of the 
global financial crisis, China may not surpass Japan’s 1980s peak of around 10%.  However, 
U.S. imports from China in 2008 ($337.8 billion) still exceeded their level in 2007 ($321.5 
billion); the 2008 bilateral trade imbalance ($266.3 billion) also exceeded 2007’s record figure, 
although only by $10 billion.
1  
Unlike the principles of most favored nation treatment (Article I) and national treatment 
(Article III), there is no “Article” of the GATT 1947 clearly identifying reciprocity as a GATT 
principle. However, the Articles that govern how countries renegotiate concessions—in 
particular Articles XXVIII and XIX—do contain explicit language about reciprocity, and the 
GATT/WTO practice of reciprocity has typically resulted in a balance of market-opening 
concessions across the major players in the system.
2  But if a large economy such as Japan or 
China pursues an export-led growth strategy, the resulting increase in exports disturbs the initial 
“balance of concessions,” i.e., the reciprocal market-access outcome. The major trading 
partners that receive the increased exports may then seek ways to rebalance the bargain.    
                                                 
1 Morrison (2009), Table 1. These data refer to trade in goods only. Bilateral trade in both directions 
dropped sharply in early 2009 relative to the corresponding period in 2008.   
2 Economic analyses such as Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) treat the GATT/WTO as a self-enforcing 
agreement and focus on outcomes sustained through each member’s recognition that any country can 
seek to amend the initial bargain. From the perspective of sustainability and in light of the constraints that 
self-enforcement implies, the rule of reciprocity then feeds back to the conduct of initial negotiations.  See 
discussions in Bown (2002a, 2002b).    3
This paper examines the policy responses of the United States to the rapid growth of 
imports from Japan and China and the associated bilateral imbalances.  We interpret U.S. trade 
policy activity vis-à-vis these countries during their respective export growth episodes within the 
"reciprocity" framework.  The basic theory that sustainability of the GATT/WTO bargain requires 
large players to maintain a reciprocal balance of market access—i.e., to keep bilateral trade 
roughly balanced—helps to explain the bilateral trade policy actions the United States chose to 
pursue?
 3 
We begin in section 2 by considering some relevant features of the two episodes, 
identifying similarities and differences.  We then examine how the United States has responded 
to bilateral imbalances with Japan and China, treating not only the “symptoms” (rapid import 
growth from the relevant partner and slow export growth to that partner) but also the underlying 
causes of the imbalances as perceived by U.S. officials and the U.S. public. In the face of a 
large bilateral trade deficit, the United States has used trade policy to treat the symptoms 
directly, i.e., to slow the partner’s export expansion into the U.S. market and to speed up U.S. 
exporters’ expansion into the partner’s market. Section 3 compares U.S. measures intended to 
slow Japan’s expanding exports to the United States in the 1970s–1990s and China’s 
expanding exports since the 1990s.  Section 4 describes U.S. efforts during the same periods to 
promote U.S. export expansion into the Japanese and Chinese import markets. Sections 3 and 
4 also show how U.S. efforts to treat the symptoms may have influenced the evolution of the 
rules of the international trading system under the GATT and WTO Agreements. 
The second half of the paper examines underlying causes of the bilateral trade 
imbalances as perceived by U.S. officials and the public, U.S. policy approaches implemented 
with respect to Japan and China to address some of these causes, and the resulting 
implications for the rules of the trading system.  In section 5 we examine the bilateral trade 
imbalances at the industry level; we focus on U.S. policies based on the premise that such 
imbalances are due to a competitive advantage unfairly created by foreign (Japanese or 
Chinese) policies, e.g., industrial policy, explicit and implicit government subsidies, and currency 
manipulation. In section 6 we examine the bilateral trade imbalances from a broader 
macroeconomic perspective.  This perspective helps to explain the end of the U.S.-Japanese 
                                                 
3 The increased incentive to defect from the initial bargain can result from economic forces that are 
completely distinct from any political incentive to raise tariffs, e.g., to assist a preferred domestic industry 
or to redistribute income. An importing country’s market power increases when it imports more from a 
trading partner. Such an increase in market power creates an incentive for the importing country to raise 
its tariffs and thus improve its own terms of trade, an economic rationale for increased tariffs that is 
separate from any political motive. Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) provide recent empirical evidence 
that importers’ market power does influence their trade policies; except when constrained by international 
agreements, the United States has set higher barriers on imports where it has greater market power.  
   4
bilateral imbalance episode in the 1990s, and may also speak to the resolution of the U.S.-
China bilateral imbalance.  Section 7 concludes.   
Our purpose in the paper is to describe actions taken by the United States and interpret 
them in terms of the role played by reciprocity in theories of the GATT/WTO as a self-enforcing 
agreement. The paper is thus intended to be descriptive and analytical, not normative.  While 
we characterize certain U.S. policies as “targeting” Japanese or Chinese exports, we do not 
attempt a systematic evaluation either of the effectiveness of these policies in achieving their 
objectives or their consistency with national laws and international agreements.  Likewise, we 
do not attempt a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of Japanese and Chinese industrial 
and macroeconomic policies in promoting economic growth or their conformity with international 
agreements. 
2. U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China: Similarities and differences in the two episodes 
There are striking parallels and also important differences between the U.S.-Japan frictions that 
peaked in the mid-1980s and the more recent U.S.-China frictions that began in the late 1990s. 
The most salient common element is the huge size of the bilateral trade imbalances.  To many, 
the imbalances themselves are convincing evidence of unfair trading practices.
4  In both cases, 
a large bilateral trade deficit has been linked in the public mind to the steady decline in the 
share of manufacturing in total U.S. employment.  Also similar are the allegations that the 
extraordinary export growth has been sustained by factors such as government subsidies and 
persistent currency undervaluation, rather than—or at least in addition to—comparative 
advantage. Both countries prevented currency appreciation, especially relative to the U.S. 
dollar, through accumulation of dollar-denominated government securities.
5  Both countries also 
                                                 
4 Although the link has wide acceptance among U.S. policy makers and the public, economic analysis 
indicates that bilateral imbalances have no particular significance in a multi-country world; free trade 
based on comparative advantage would be expected to produce trade surpluses with some partners and 
trade deficits with others. Moreover, as we discuss in section 6 below, an overall external imbalance 
cannot exist without a corresponding imbalance between domestic saving and domestic investment 
spending.      
  
5 Corden (1981) advances an analysis of exchange-rate protection of the entire tradables sector through 
currency undervaluation.  Unlike the use of trade policies to favor exports or restrict competing imports 
selectively, undervaluation does not create distortions within the tradables sector as a whole.  Recent 
empirical research shows that currency undervaluation is associated with export surges and higher GDP 
growth, especially for developing countries (Freund and Pierola, 2008; Rodrik, 2008).  Rodrik suggests 
that an undervalued exchange rate may offset an informational market failure that would otherwise 
prevent firms in developing countries from identifying potential export products or markets.  However, 
Staiger and Sykes (2008) use a theoretical analysis to show that the effects of exchange-rate 
undervaluation are complex and depend on a variety of underlying conditions; in some cases, exchange-
rate intervention would have no real effects. Given the complex relationship between exchange practices 
and trade volumes, Staiger and Sykes are doubtful that China’s exchange-rate policies constitute a 
violation of its WTO commitments, i.e., by acting as an across-the-board export subsidy.   5
channeled capital to preferred sectors through the banking system, in both cases eventually 
resulting in an overhang of bad loans that complicated efforts to improve capital-market 
efficiency.
6  Table 1 summarizes many of these comparisons. 
One last and very significant common element in the two episodes is the response from 
the United States as well as other affected importing nations: the persistent use of 
discriminatory strategies to delay adjustment to growth of competing imports from the new 
sources.  These strategies violate the spirit and sometimes also the letter of the GATT/WTO 
principle of most favored nation (MFN) treatment, i.e., nondiscrimination among trading 
partners.   The immediate result has been to protect established import suppliers as well as 
domestic producers from the full effects of surging imports from the new sources.  The longer-
term result has been to promote growth of imports from still newer sources.  Protection targeted 
at Japan promoted export growth first in textiles and later in steel and semiconductors from the 
“newly industrializing economies” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan); recent 
U.S. and EU actions in textiles and apparel targeted at China have benefited Vietnam, India, 
and Bangladesh, along with U.S. partners in various preferential trade agreements.  The United 
States also initiated bilateral negotiations with Japan and later China to increase their purchases 
of U.S. exports.  We provide more details on U.S. trade policies toward Japan and China in 
sections 3 and 4 below. 
In addition, the United States has sought to limit foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies 
by both nations (as well as others) on “national security” grounds. The Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) was established in 1975 for the purpose of monitoring 
the effects of inward FDI.
7   In 1988, the U.S. Congress gave the President the power to block a 
foreign takeover based on advice from CFIUS indicating a threat to national security.
8 For 
example, U.S. authorities prevented the acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor by Japan’s 
Fujitsu in 1987 and of Unocal, an oil producer, by the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation 
                                                 
6 According to Saxonhouse (1983), Japan’s industrial policy in the 1970s should be viewed as a means to 
overcome distortions resulting from the country’s poorly functioning capital market. China uses industrial 
policy tools including taxation, indicative lending, and input pricing to provide firms with incentives 
intended to achieve desired modifications in the composition of economic activity (Bergsten et al., 2008; 
USITC 2007, Chapter 2). China categorizes its industries as “encouraged,” “restricted,” or “to be 
eliminated,” with these classifications subject to frequent revision, and structures incentives accordingly.  
Although an ongoing goal of Chinese industrial policy is to facilitate movement from a planned to a market 
economy, firms owned entirely or in part by government units continue to play a major role in the 
economy.    
7 Following World War II, U.S. participation in FDI was almost entirely as a home base for outward 
investments.  Inward FDI began to take off in the 1970s, and by the mid-1980s the United States had 
become the world’s largest host to inward FDI.  CFIUS, an interagency committee chaired by the 
Treasury Secretary, was intended to address public and official concern regarding foreign control over 
U.S. economic activity. 
8 Congress passed the Exon-Florio amendment (§721 of the Defense Production Act) during a period of 
growing concern about foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets.   6
(CNOOC) in 2005.  In contrast, greenfield investments, notably foreign-owned auto assembly 
plants, have been assiduously courted.
9 
Along with these striking similarities, there are also fundamental differences between the 
two cases.  Most important, Japan was already an established industrial nation in the 1980s.  By 
the mid-1980s, Japan’s per capita income was above that of most European nations; enrollment 
rates for secondary and higher education were likewise comparable to those of the richest 
nations (World Development Report 1986).  In contrast, China is still poor, at least in terms of 
per capita income (around $3,000 in 2007), despite a prolonged period of stellar growth 
performance.
10  Thus, it is not surprising that earlier trade frictions between Japan and the 
United States focused mainly on direct competition, i.e., Japan’s increasing share of the U.S. 
market and its displacement of U.S. exports in third-country markets.  Moreover, as a wealthy 
country, Japan consumed many of the same types of goods and services produced by the 
United States but imported too few of those from the United States—at least in the view of U.S. 
producers and policy makers.  
Given China’s much lower per capita income, only a small fraction of Chinese 
consumers can yet afford the products that represent U.S. comparative advantage, i.e., those 
supplied by intellectual-property-intensive industries (films, music, software, pharmaceuticals), 
when sold at prices that reflect full enforcement of U.S. intellectual property rights. Moreover, 
Chinese consumers’ desire to acquire such goods at affordable prices feeds the demand for 
pirated and copycat goods produced locally, thereby adding to U.S. complaints regarding 
China’s lax enforcement of intellectual property rights.  But this consumption pattern also implies 
that China’s continued growth may help to increase still further the country’s already large 
imports from the United States.
11 
As a reflection of the large differences in relative factor abundance and productivity 
between the United States and Japan, direct competition with China has been an important 
issue for only a few U.S. industries, mainly for labor-intensive “sunset” industries like apparel.  
Rather, China has displaced other established trading partners in supplying the U.S. market.  As 
Figure 1 illustrates, China’s share of the total U.S. trade deficit has largely replaced the share of 
                                                 
9 The 1981 U.S. VERs limiting auto imports from Japan encouraged Japanese companies to move their 
factories to the United States.  Between 1984 and 1987, seven Japanese companies built U.S. assembly 
plants. These were financed in large part by the abnormally high profits resulting from the VERs.  By 
increasing supply to the U.S. market, the Japanese investments reduced profits of both Japanese and 
U.S. auto makers (De Melo and Tarr, 1991).   
10 Per capita income and other national averages mask large differences between the coastal areas and 
the interior provinces in the north and west of the country.  
11 As of 2008, China was already the third largest market for U.S. merchandise exports, although a large 
share of those exports consisted of agricultural products and raw materials.    7
other East Asian countries over the period from 1989 through 2007.
12  In 1989, U.S. trade with 
China (including Hong Kong) accounted for less than 9% of the total, Japan about 45%, and 
other East Asian countries about 26%.  By 2008, China’s share had soared to more than 31%, 
while those of Japan and the rest of East Asia had fallen to around 9% each.
13  Increased 
competition from China has stimulated interest on the part of other nations in negotiating 
preferential trade agreements with the United States as a means of getting better-than-MFN 
access to the lucrative U.S. market (Bown and McCulloch, 2007). However, the nature of 
competition from China has been shifting rapidly. U.S. officials have signaled their displeasure 
that China is encouraging development in high-technology sectors, including some sectors that 
will offer direct competition comparable to that in the earlier U.S.-Japan episode. 
In terms of overall trade patterns, there are similarities as well as differences.  Like 
Japan, China is a major importer of raw materials, and these imports have grown at a pace 
similar to that of its exports.   However, China is far more open to manufactured imports, both of 
final goods and intermediate inputs, the latter an indication of China’s much greater involvement 
in international vertical specialization.  China’s trade to GDP ratio (2005–2007) was 71.3%, an 
astonishing figure given China’s size and level of development.  In contrast, the corresponding 
ratio for the United States was 27.2% and for Japan 31.5%.
14  Another significant difference is 
the role played by foreign direct investment (FDI).  The first of China’s export-oriented Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs), which opened in 1980, encouraged FDI through preferential treatment 
of foreign investors.
15  By 2004, China’s stock of inward FDI stood at $702 billion, with an FDI to 
GDP ratio of 0.42, compared with Japan’s 1986 stock of $7 billion, a negligible share of GDP.  
Indeed, even by 2004, Japan’s FDI stock was still only $97 billion, and its FDI to GDP ratio was 
just 0.02.
16  While Japan and China both achieved rapid productivity improvement through 
                                                 
12  We follow  common practice in expressing national and regional bilateral imbalances as shares or 
fractions of the overall U.S. imbalance.  Note, however, that some U.S. bilateral balances are positive.  
Moreover, this presentation may suggest that movements in individual bilateral balances are determined 
independently, while in fact they can be linked causally.  In particular, the reduction over time in the 
shares of Japan and other East Asian countries reflects relocation via direct foreign investment of 
processing activities to China.      
  
13 These shifts reflect the growth of China’s “processing trade” in which Chinese subsidiaries of Japanese 
manufacturing firms import intermediate inputs from Japan and export final goods to the United States. 
Similar supply chains link China to other more advanced neighbors in East Asia, such as Korea and 
Taiwan. See Dean, Lovely, and Mora (2009); Van Assche, Hong, and Ma (2009); and Greaney and Li 
(2009).   
 
14 WTO (2008a).  Data for China do not include Hong Kong, with a ratio of 397%, nearly half of which 
represents exports to the mainland. 
15 One result may have been round-tripping of mainland capital, i.e., mainland investors routing funds 
through Hong Kong firms in order to qualify for the preferential treatment reserved for FDI.   8
adaptation of advanced technologies developed in richer countries, Japan acquired technology 
mainly through licensing agreements, while for China FDI has been a major channel for 
technology transfer.
17 
Although industrial policy has played an important role in both Japan and China, the 
dominant role of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) in the 1970s and 1980s has no close parallel in the China of today.  Instead, 
much of China’s economic policy-making has been decentralized, with the direction of industrial 
development the result of input at many levels, from the national to the “village.”
18  In this 
respect China more closely resembles the United States or the European Union, where 
individual sub-national units enjoy considerable scope for setting priorities and implementing 
policies.  Finally, although moving from a planned toward a market economy, China remains a 
communist state and has not made significant steps toward a democratic system of government 
at the national level.  However, elections are routine at the village level and sometimes even 
mandatory.  Japan’s national government is an elected parliament, and economic policy making 
remains relatively centralized.  
These political and economic differences have direct implications for the resolution of 
trade disputes, whether through bilateral negotiations or through actions taken in the 
GATT/WTO system.  Officials of China’s national government may enjoy more freedom of 
action than their Japanese counterparts since the government does not need to satisfy a 
representative electorate.  However, Chinese officials believe that the country’s political stability 
is highly dependent on continued economic growth.  Chinese policy makers were therefore 
aggressive in stimulating domestic demand as a means to offset the effects of the sharp drop in 
exports that China experienced in early 2009. 
The trade policy options available to the United States and other trading partners in 
dealing with China may be more circumscribed than in the case of Japan because of China’s 
extensive links to these economies via FDI and vertical specialization.
19 In the WTO, 
enforcement of a successful complaint is accomplished entirely through limited authorized 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 Hufbauer, Wong, and Sheth (2006, p. 77).  Data for China include inward FDI from Hong Kong, of 
which some portion is due to round-tripping from the mainland.  With Hong Kong considered separately 
from China, in 2008 Hong Kong ranked #3 worldwide in terms of FDI stock, after the United States and 
the United Kingdom, while China ranked #6, after France and Germany.  Japan was #24 (CIA 2009). 
17 In at least a few cases, firms in each country sought to acquire technology by acquiring foreign 
companies or by using subsidiaries as listening posts in the United States and other advanced countries.  
In both cases, industrial espionage was also alleged. 
18  Perkins (2001), Bergsten et al. (2008), USITC (2007).  Bergsten et al. also note efforts in the early to 
mid-1990s to recentralize, particularly in the area of tax collection. 
 
19  On the other hand, security concerns may have shaped U.S. policies toward Japan until 1975, given 
U.S. reliance on Japanese bases during the Vietnam War.   9
retaliation, or at least the threat of retaliation. Given the important role of FDI and vertical 
specialization in most of China’s export sectors, finding suitable targets for authorized retaliation 
may prove difficult.
20  Nonetheless, the United States has moved since 2006 toward greater 
reliance on the WTO in handling its trade conflicts with China.   
3. Treating the symptoms (1): U.S. efforts to limit expansion of foreign exports into the 
U.S. market 
In the face of major bilateral trade imbalances with Japan beginning in the 1970s and with China 
beginning in the 1990s, the United States implemented policies intended to slow these 
countries’ export expansion into the U.S. market.  In this section we compare U.S. attempts to 
slow imports from Japan and from China, examining in turn voluntary export restraints, 
antidumping, countervailing duties, safeguards, and formation of preferential trading 
arrangements with other sources of U.S. imports.  
3.1. Voluntary export restraints (VERs) 
3.1.1. Japan: VER proliferation across industries, 1960s–1990s  
Japan was admitted to the GATT in 1955 with strong support from the United States.  Fourteen 
other GATT contracting parties, fearing import competition based on low Japanese wages, 
initially limited their liberalization commitments by invoking Article XXXV. However, problems 
soon arose in the U.S.-Japan relationship over Japanese textile exports.  By 1957, the first 
orderly marketing agreements (OMAs) between the United States and Japan had been 
signed.
21   These agreements represented a U.S. decision to forego GATT-sanctioned remedies 
in favor of a non-MFN, bilateral approach to handling trade frictions and set a pattern replicated 
for additional products and importing and exporting countries in subsequent decades in the form 
of negotiated “voluntary” export restraints. The market incentives created by the initial 
discriminatory form of protection eventually produced the worldwide Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
(MFA) in 1974.  The MFA placed bilateral quantitative limits on textile and apparel trade 
between most pairs of importing and exporting countries until it was phased out as part of the 
package negotiated in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations concluded in 1994.   
In part due to the “success” of agreements on textiles (which promoted growth of exports 
from other, not yet restricted, countries in Asia and elsewhere) and as Japan made a full 
recovery from the effects of World War II, Japan’s exports and U.S.-Japan trade frictions shifted 
toward a succession of more sophisticated products. For many products, rapid export growth 
                                                 
20 See, for example, the discussion in Bown (2009b). 
21 The United States had already negotiated similar restrictions on Japanese textile exports prior to World 
War II.   10
resulted first in a U.S. safeguard (Section 201) petition requesting relief from surging imports for 
an injured domestic industry and then a negotiated VER.  Table 2 gives examples of U.S. 
safeguard investigations resulting in such OMAs during the 1970s and 1980s in Japanese 
export products such as footwear, steel, television receivers, and even autos.  
As Table 2 indicates, the safeguard law was not the only import-restricting policy that 
allowed U.S. industries to seek new trade barriers and that ultimately resulted in bilaterally 
negotiated VERs limiting Japanese exports to the United States.
22  U.S. antidumping policy, 
which we discuss in more detail in section 3.2 below, also resulted in a number of Japanese 
VERs. The most important of these was the semiconductor VER, negotiated after a pair of 
antidumping petitions filed in 1985.
23  A 1993 petition under the U.S. antidumping law also 
resulted in a VER over photo paper between the U.S. firm Kodak and the Japanese firm Fuji; 
this dispute was a precursor to a high-profile WTO dispute between Kodak and Fuji. A 1996 
antidumping petition over sodium azide resulted in a negotiated VER with three Japanese 
chemical-producing firms.  
 
3.1.2. China: VERs in textiles and apparel, 2005-2008 
The terms of China’s 2001 accession to the WTO granted WTO members a number of China-
specific transitional safeguard mechanisms designed to cope with an anticipated increase in 
exports from China, and especially textile and apparel exports following the scheduled end of 
the MFA.  For the 2001–2008 period, a U.S. safeguard program covering only U.S. imports of 
textile and apparel products from China was administered by the Office of Textiles and Apparel 
(OTEXA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce.  
Facing a surge in imports of textile and apparel products from China following the 
expiration of the MFA at the end of 2004, the United States negotiated a voluntary export 
                                                 
22 During this period, the United States also negotiated VERs with Japan and other exporters outside the 
legal frameworks of the safeguard and antidumping laws.  For example, in 1986 the United States 
negotiated a VER with Japan and other countries over machine tools under section 232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962.  Section 232 authorizes the President to implement new import restrictions 
grounds of national security (Hufbauer and Elliott 1994, 91). Voluntary restraints on flat-rolled steel 
products had been negotiated in 1985 (Hufbauer and Elliott 1994, 103). 
23 In July 1985, Micron filed an antidumping petition over 64K DRAMS that led to the imposition of duties 
on imports from Japanese firms Hitachi, Mitsubishi, NEC, and Oki Electric. The duty order on 64K 
DRAMS remained in place until 1993. In October 1985, U.S. firms Advanced Micro Devices, Intel, and 
National Semiconductor filed a separate petition over EPROMS, and in December 1985 the U.S. 
government self-initiated a petition over 256K and above DRAMS. The petitions led to negotiated VERs 
(“Suspension Agreements” in the language of U.S. antidumping) by which Japanese firms Fujitsu, Hitachi, 
NEC, and Tokyo Shibaura (Toshiba) agreed to limit exports to the U.S. market. The 256K DRAM 
suspension agreement was revoked in 1991, but the EPROM agreement was not formally revoked until 
1997. Additional detailed data on each of these antidumping cases has been compiled in Bown (2009a).   11
restraint with China for the 2005–2008 period.
 24  Although the rules of the WTO preclude use of 
VERs, as we describe in more detail below, this policy tool nonetheless returned, as before in 
the context of one major player seeking to slow the export expansion of another major trading 
partner.
 25   
3.2. U.S. antidumping against Japan and China  
Antidumping (AD) is a second policy tool the United States has used to slow the expansion of 
Japanese and Chinese exports into the U.S. market.  Japan and China together faced a major 
share of all U.S. antidumping activity over the 1979–2008 period; 25% of all U.S. antidumping 
investigations targeted either Japanese or Chinese producers, and 33% of all U.S. antidumping 
measures imposed targeted either Japanese or Chinese exports.
26   
However, as Figure 2 indicates, U.S. use of antidumping over 1979–2008 is really made 
up of two distinct episodes: the rise (1979–1988) and fall (1989–2008) of antidumping use to 
manage the growth of Japan’s exports to the United States, and increased use of antidumping 
(since 1989) to manage the growth of China’s exports to the United States.  In Figure 2, the 
bars indicate the number of U.S. antidumping measures imposed during various sub-periods 
between 1979 and 2008; the lines indicate the respective shares of Japan and China in total 
U.S. AD measures imposed in each of the sub-periods. U.S. targeting of Japan with 
antidumping reached its peak in the 1984–1988 period, when the United States imposed more 
than 20 new import restrictions on Japanese exporting firms; measures restricting imports from 
                                                 
24 On the economic effects of the end of the MFA, see Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott (forthcoming) 
and Barrows and Harrigan (2009). 
25 Under the self-enforcing WTO system, the United States and China were free to choose this option as 
long as no country filed a complaint. The WTO’s Trade Policy Review of China (WTO 2006, 60–61) 
describes the VER settlements between the U.S. and China (as well as a similar arrangement between 
the EC and China): 
“On 10 June 2005, China and the European Communities signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), placing export restraints on ten categories of Chinese textiles and clothing exports to the EC until 
31 December 2007.   The growth rates of these exports would be limited to between 8 percent and 12.5 
percent per year.  As a quid pro quo, the EC agreed to end its ongoing safeguard investigation on these 
products and to refrain from adopting measures as permitted under Article 242 of China's WTO Working 
Party Report, in categories not covered by the MOU…Under the Interim Measures, MOFCOM compiles a 
"Catalogue of Textiles Products Subject to Interim Export Administration", including exports of textiles and 
clothing subject to restrictions imposed by countries or regions unilaterally, and textile exports subject to 
temporary quantitative control under bilateral agreements.   For each product listed in the Catalogue, the 
quota is partly assigned through a bidding system, and partly allocated based on the exporter's share in 
China's total export value for the previous year in the respective categories.…A similar agreement was 
signed with the United States on 8 November 2005.  The restraints on certain categories of textiles and 
clothing exports from China are effective from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2008; exports of these 
products are expected to increase by 8 percent to 10 percent in 2006, by 13 percent in 2007, and 17 
percent in 2008.” 
26 These are the authors’ estimates based on the data in Bown (2009a).  Investigations naming firms in 
more than one European Union member country for the same product are combined as a single case.      12
Japan alone accounted for more than 20% of all new AD measures the United States imposed 
during that period.  
After 1988, U.S. use of AD against Japan slowly declined, whether measured by the 
number of new measures imposed on Japanese exporters or by Japan’s share in total U.S. use 
of antidumping.  At the same time, U.S. use of antidumping shifted dramatically toward 
imposition of new import restrictions against China. During the second half of the period (1999–
2008), the United States imposed more than 50 new antidumping import restrictions on Chinese 
exporters, and these restrictions were roughly a third of all antidumping measures the United 
States imposed during this period.   
Figure 3 illustrates the time pattern of U.S. antidumping investigations and measures 
imposed against Japan (panel a, 1979–2000) and against China (panel b, 1989–2007) as 
compared with the growth of the U.S. bilateral trade deficit (normalized as a share of the total 
value of bilateral trade) with each country. The data show a strong positive correlation over time 
between the size of the bilateral trade deficit and the frequency with which the partner has 
become a target of U.S. antidumping to limit the trading partner’s export expansion into the U.S. 
market.  However, while U.S. antidumping activity against Japan began to decline as the yen 
rose in value relative to the U.S. dollar in 1985, antidumping activity against China continued 
unabated even after the yuan began to appreciate relative to the dollar in 2005.   
3.3. Countervailing duties and country-specific safeguards 
In the context of the differential response in U.S. treatment of Japan and China, two additional 
policies of contingent protection are countervailing duties and country-specific safeguards.  
First, under the U.S. countervailing duty or “anti-subsidy” law, officials can target imports 
believed to have been unfairly subsidized by foreign governments; such imports are then 
subject to an import tax equal in size to the foreign subsidy. Interestingly, the United States 
never used its countervailing duty law to address imports from Japan over the entire 1979–2008 
period.
27  
From 1979 until 2006, the United States also never used its countervailing duty law to 
impose new import restrictions on China.
28  A 1984 policy decision of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce explicitly exempted China cases from consideration under the countervailing duty 
                                                 
27 Out of 533 countervailing duty investigations in the United States between 1979 and April 2008, only 
one involved imports from Japan, a 1982 investigation of “Certain Nuts Bolts and Screws.” However, the 
case was withdrawn before receiving even a preliminary subsidy or injury determination. 
28 Domestic industries did initiate three countervailing duty petitions during this time period, however.  
U.S. petitions were filed in 1984 (“Textiles and Textile Products”), 1991 (“Oscillating Fans and Ceiling 
Fans”) and 1992 (“Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts And Wheel Locks”), but all of these cases were either 
withdrawn or terminated without any Department of Commerce or U.S. International Trade Commission 
ruling.  See Bown (2009a).   13
statute.  However, in November 2006, U.S. producers of coated free sheet paper included 
China in a petition they were filing against Indonesia and Korea over alleged subsidies.  In 
March 2007, the Commerce Department opened the door for the United States to begin 
imposing countervailing duties on imports from China by reversing its earlier policy.
29  I n  
December 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) made a negative injury 
determination in the coated free sheet paper case, and no duties were imposed. However, the 
Commerce Department’s 2007 policy reversal allowed other U.S. industries to request import 
protection against China under the countervailing duty law. As Table 3 indicates, thirteen 
additional investigations against China had been initiated as of April 2009, and all cases that 
had reached the stage of a final decision resulted in the imposition of new countervailing duties, 
one as high as 226%.
30 
Second, upon China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, the United States implemented 
two separate China safeguards in domestic legislation. The first safeguard, as discussed above, 
was limited to the 2001–2008 period, covered U.S. textiles and apparel imports only, and was 
administered by OTEXA in the U.S. Department of Commerce. Separately, under Section 421 
of the U.S. trade law, the United States has access to a broader China-specific safeguard 
through 2014, one that is administered in much the same way as the U.S. global safeguards 
(Section 201) law, with injury investigations taking place at the USITC and the U.S. President 
ultimately granted the discretionary authority to determine any policy response to the 
investigation.  
Table 4 lists a number of China-specific safeguard investigations initiated under the 
Section 421 law between 2002 and 2009.  No new import restrictions were imposed despite a 
number of USITC affirmative injury votes and recommendations to the President for new import 
restrictions. But the table also indicates that three of the six products investigated but denied 
import protection under the China safeguard did gain import protection under the U.S. 
antidumping law within five years after the failed China-safeguard investigation. Furthermore, 
the first China-safeguard investigation initiated during the Obama administration, in the case 
brought by the United Steel Workers over “Certain passenger vehicle and light truck tires,” did 
result in the imposition of new 35% tariffs in September 2009. 
                                                 
29 See Department of Commerce, “Press Release: Commerce Applies Anti-Subsidy Law to China,” 
http://www.commerce.gov/opa/press/Secretary_Gutierrez/2007_Releases/March/30_Gutierrez_China_An
ti-subsidy_law_application_rls.html, 30 March 2007. 
30 The product-level countervailing duty investigations listed in Table 3 were initiated simultaneously with 
antidumping investigations of the same Chinese firms and products; most of these investigations resulted 
in the imposition of antidumping duties.     14
3.4. Improving the relative terms of access to the U.S. market for other exporters 
U.S. imposition of restrictions on imports from Japan and China sometimes benefits producers 
in other (unrestricted) exporting nations in addition to, or rather than, competing U.S. producers.  
This has been especially true for Chinese textiles and apparel, where other developing 
countries share China’s comparative advantage relative to the United States.  In such cases, 
restrictions on Japan and China have improved the relative terms of U.S. import market access 
available to other exporters.  However, in many cases the United States has created a similar 
relative advantage for other exporters through a variety of preferential (discriminatory) trade 
arrangements.  Most of these arrangements are permitted under GATT/WTO rules. 
Trading partners that competed with Japan in the U.S. market and benefited from formal 
preferential trade agreements with the United States during this period include Israel (1985) and 
Canada (1987). With the growth of U.S. imports from China, the United States entered into 
preferential deals with Mexico (NAFTA, 1994), Central American countries and the Dominican 
Republic (CAFTA-DR, 2004), Bahrain (2006), and Morocco (2006).  The United States also 
offered various groups of developing countries further extensions of major preferential 
programs.  These included the Generalized System of Preferences; for Caribbean nations, the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (1983, substantially expanded in 2000 through the U.S.-Caribbean 
Basin Trade Partnership Act), for Andean countries, the Andean Trade Preference Act (1992, 
expanded as the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act under the Trade Act of 
2002); and for countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (2000; 
revised in 2002, 2004, and 2006).  While such special preferential arrangements may have 
been motivated primarily by U.S. foreign-policy considerations rather than as a means to restore 
the market position of established suppliers to the U.S. market, their result nonetheless is to 
improve the market access of firms in other countries relative to their rivals in China.
31 
4. Treating the symptoms (2): U.S. efforts to improve its exporters’ market access in 
Japan and China  
The second strategy a country facing a bilateral trade imbalance due to continued export 
expansion into its market can use to rebalance concessions is to expand its own exporters’ 
access to the other country’s market.  The United States has pursued this approach against 
Japan, and to a lesser extent more recently against China, via a combination of formal trade 
disputes initiated under the multilateral auspices of the GATT (1955–1994) and WTO (1995 
onward) dispute-settlement systems, as well as its unilateral Section 301 law (1974 onward).  
                                                 
31 The USTR website provides a detailed description of U.S. trade preferences for various groups of 
developing countries: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs. 
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Under Section 301 of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act, a U.S. export industry can petition the U.S. 
government to take up its concern that it has lost foreign market access because another 
country is not living up to a trade agreement it has signed with the United States.
32 Section 301 
was strengthened and revitalized in 1988. 
4.1. U.S. formal market-opening actions against Japan 
When Japan joined the GATT in 1955, the country was still very poor.  The post-World War II 
occupation by the United States had only ended in 1952, and Japan’s domestic market was not 
yet attractive to U.S. exporters of manufactured goods.  Japan had relied heavily on food 
imports from the United States and other countries in the immediate postwar period, but as 
Japanese farmers recovered from the war, the demand for imported food waned.  Traditional 
policies of self-sufficiency began to be restored, and in some cases U.S. food exports were 
excluded.  Thus, early market-opening efforts focused on agricultural products.   
By the mid-1970s, the United States had adopted a more formal and legalistic approach 
to improving its exporters’ access to the Japanese market through the combined use of GATT 
dispute settlement and its Section 301 policy. Over the next twenty years, U.S. officials pursued 
at least 23 different formal actions against Japan in attempts to open up its market to U.S. 
exports. Figure 4 shows formal U.S. market-opening initiatives against Japan and the bilateral 
U.S.-Japan trade deficit by year from 1965 through 2000.  Similar to the U.S. use of 
antidumping against imports from Japan as shown in Figure 3a, there is a strong positive 
correlation between the size of the bilateral trade deficit and these formal U.S. actions 
attempting to open up Japan’s markets to U.S. exports.   
Table 5 presents detailed information on 23 formal Section 301, GATT, and WTO trade 
disputes that the United States initiated to open up Japan’s market.
33 While the United States 
had begun using the GATT dispute-settlement provisions in 1948, it did not file its first formal 
trade dispute against Japan until 1977.
34  U.S. use of GATT dispute settlement in the attempt to 
open up Japan’s market to its firms was most frequent during the 1977–1988 period, when it 
filed a total of 11 formal disputes against Japan. Japan was clearly an important target for the 
United States during this period, facing nearly a third of the 35 GATT trade disputes the United 
                                                 
32 For a discussion of Section 301, see Bhagwati and Patrick (1990) and Bayard and Elliott (1994). 
33 All but one of the Section 301 cases against Japan listed in Table 5 are primarily about a U.S. export 
industry seeking additional access to the Japanese import market. The one case that does not fall into 
this category is the 1976 investigation in which Japan and the European Community were accused of 
colluding in a way that deflected Japanese exports away from the EC import market and toward the U.S. 
import market. 
34 This section draws on data compiled by Hudec (1993). The United States was not the first country to 
file a formal GATT trade dispute against Japan.  Australia filed a formal dispute in 1974 over Japanese 
quantitative import restrictions on beef.     16
States initiated. Beginning in 1989, partially out of frustration with the relatively toothless 
dispute-settlement provisions of the GATT and partially as a negotiating tactic to increase the 
pressure on the other GATT contracting parties to reform the dispute-settlement provisions, the 
United States shifted away from using GATT dispute settlement and instead relied solely on its 
unilateral Section 301 policy tool to pursue cases against Japan. Whereas all but one of the 
Section 301 investigations against Japan during 1977–1988 resulted in the United States 
bringing a formal GATT trade dispute, none of the next four Section 301 cases, initiated during 
1989–1994, did so.
35  In the WTO era that began in 1995, all U.S. Section 301 investigations of 
Japan have been forwarded to WTO dispute settlement, along with two other disputes that were 
not initiated through the Section 301 channel. 
As the products in Table 5 indicate, U.S. use of these formal channels to seek additional 
Japanese market access for its exporters has spanned a considerable range of sectors and 
issues.  In the 1970s, desired market access was primarily in agriculture-based products 
(tobacco, leather) and lower-value-added manufacturing (silk, cigars, cigarettes, footwear, bats). 
In the mid-1980s, while there were continued pressures to obtain Japanese market access for 
U.S. agricultural products (dairy, legumes, starches, sugars, groundnuts, pineapple, tomato, 
fish, citrus, and beef) and also wood products, there were new issues of importance to U.S 
exporters as well.  Some of this involved intellectual-property-intensive export products where 
the United States had a strong comparative advantage (semiconductors, supercomputers, 
satellites, auto parts), but also involved were issue-areas and disciplines where the GATT rules 
were only slowly becoming responsive, e.g., trade in services (construction, architectural, 
engineering) as well as three separate disputes over Japan’s government-procurement 
procedures.  
4.2. U.S. formal market-opening actions against China 
China was one of the original contracting parties to the GATT but withdrew following the 
communist revolution in 1950.  Although China became interested in rejoining (and achieving 
MFN status) soon after the 1979 commencement of market-oriented reforms and it gained 
GATT observer status in 1982, it did not resume full-fledged membership in the GATT/WTO 
                                                 
35 The only Section 301 investigation of Japan during 1977–1988 that did not lead to a U.S.-initiated 
GATT dispute was the semiconductor case initiated in 1985. As noted in section 3.1.1 above, the U.S. 
domestic industry simultaneously filed antidumping petitions against Japanese exports, which led to the 
negotiation of voluntary export restraints and ultimately the bilateral semiconductor agreements.  Under 
these agreements, Japan promised to undertake “voluntary import expansions” to increase 
semiconductor imports from U.S. exporters.  This in turn led to two formal GATT disputes.  The EC 
initiated a dispute against Japan in 1987, alleging that its agreement with the United States discriminated 
against EC exporters.  Japan initiated a dispute against the United States in 1987 after the United States 
retaliated by raising tariffs against Japan for its failure to live up to the terms of the bilateral 
semiconductor agreement.     17
system until 2001.  Perhaps learning from their experience with Japan and other countries that 
had adopted export-led growth strategies, WTO members made China’s reentry conditional on 
many special provisions.  These included some China-specific safeguards allowing members to 
impose “temporary” discriminatory restrictions on Chinese exports and others requiring China to 
comply over time with a variety of multilateral commitments.   
Moreover, the United States and other WTO members demanded many more import 
market-access commitments when they negotiated the terms of China’s accession to the WTO 
than had previously been the case with new arrivals.
36 When China acceded to the WTO in 
2001, it had cut tariffs significantly on a broad range of products, making its applied tariffs both 
relatively low and quite close to the bound rates.  As Table 6 indicates, China’s applied and 
bound tariffs in 2007 were only slightly higher than those of the United States and Japan overall 
and actually lower than Japan’s in certain areas (e.g., agriculture). China’s tariffs were also 
much lower on average than those of other major emerging economies such as India and Brazil, 
countries that have been part of the GATT/WTO system for decades longer than China. 
But as Figure 5 shows, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit has nonetheless been expanding 
rapidly, with no sign of decline after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.
37  Thus, beginning 
in 2004, the United States began efforts similar to the formal actions taken against Japan 
beginning in the late 1970s to get China to open up its market to U.S. exports. Table 7 
documents the formal trade disputes the United States has initiated against China through 
2008, in which it alleges that China has not sufficiently (quickly or in depth) lived up to its import 
market-access commitments. The domestic industries behind U.S. initiation of formal disputes 
included both dominant export interests in areas of U.S. comparative advantage (intellectual-
property-intensive goods and services like information technology, Hollywood movies and other 
media, and financial information service providers) and traditional capital-intensive industries 
(auto parts). Like the WTO disputes involving the United States and Japan discussed earlier, 
many of the issue-areas are relatively new and/or involve somewhat new disciplines, including 
TRIPS and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), where China is 
                                                 
36 When the WTO was created in the Uruguay Round, many less-developed countries were permitted to 
join without special conditions.  Other transition economies joined prior to China or around the same time 
without special conditions.  China’s “special” treatment was presumably a consequence of its already 
evident potential for significant global impact as an exporter.  The growth of Chinese exports to the United 
States, Japan, and the European Union as well as other countries did accelerate following its WTO 
accession in 2001, triggering use by some countries of the special China safeguards to manage the 
burgeoning imports. 
37 For a number of years prior to 2001, the United States had given China’s exports MFN treatment 
(Normal Trade Relations in U.S. law) even though China was not yet a member of the WTO.  Thus, 
China’s 2001 entry did not substantially reduce the U.S. applied tariffs faced by Chinese exporters, 
although it did increase the certainty of that treatment.   18
particularly vulnerable given its history of state-owned enterprises and its still incomplete 
transition to a more market-oriented economy.
38 
In considering the formal WTO disputes that the United States has chosen to initiate to 
address the bilateral imbalance with China, it is worth noting a path that the United States has 
not yet undertaken, i.e., resumption of the unilateral Section 301 actions that were criticized by 
U.S. trading partners during the GATT era.
39  The absence of unilateral actions is especially 
significant given that the USTR has received a number of petitions to investigate China under 
Section 301.  In each year between 2004 and 2007, the USTR received at least one petition 
requesting the use of Section 301 to investigate China’s exchange rate or manufacturing labor 
rights, alleging that undervaluation of China’s currency constitutes a WTO-inconsistent subsidy 
or that its mistreatment of manufacturing workers affects U.S. market access.  In each instance, 
the USTR has declined to investigate the issue of the petition.
40 
5. Attempts to address systemic issues through new GATT/WTO disciplines 
In addition to efforts to provide “symptomatic relief” for the large bilateral imbalances via U.S. 
import restrictions and export promotion, U.S. policy makers also undertook actions to address 
what they perceived as important underlying causes of the persistent imbalances. In this section 
we describe these underlying causes (as portrayed by U.S. officials and the U.S. public at large) 
                                                 
38 Indeed, the shift toward U.S. use of countervailing duty policy against China described above and 
illustrated in Table 3 may reflect the U.S. desire to speed the elimination of China’s domestic subsidy 
programs, which increase China’s ability to export while reducing foreign access to China’s domestic 
market. 
39 During the period of general U.S. emphasis on use of Section 301 (1988-1994) described above in the 
context of our discussion of Japan, the USTR also initiated three separate Section 301 investigations of 
China between 1991 and 1994.  Two of these investigations related to intellectual property rights, while 
one concerned general conditions of China’s import market access that were alleged to impose barriers 
via quantitative restrictions, burdensome licensing procedures, technical barriers, and lack of 
transparency. For a discussion, see Bayard and Elliott (1994, Appendix Table and 355-465). 
40 Specifically, USTR  (2005, 259) states, “One petition alleged that certain labor policies and practices of 
the Government of China with respect to Chinese manufacturing workers are unreasonable, as defined in 
section 301(d) of the Trade Act, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. The United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) determined not to initiate an investigation under section 301 of the Trade Act with 
respect to the petition because the Government of the United States is involved in ongoing efforts to 
address with China many of the labor issues raised in the petition, and because initiation of an 
investigation would not be effective in addressing the policies and practices covered in the petition. Two 
substantially similar petitions alleged that the policies and practices of the Government of China with 
respect to the valuation of Chinese currency deny and violate international legal rights of the United 
States, are unjustifiable, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. The USTR determined not to initiate 
investigations with respect to the petitions because the United States is involved in ongoing efforts to 
address with China the currency valuation issues raised in the petitions, and because initiation of 
investigations would not be effective in addressing the policies and practices covered in the petitions.” In 
2005 the USTR declined to pursue a similar petition against China over currency (USTR 2006, 225), in 
2006 over labor (USTR 2007, 215), and in 2007 over currency (USTR 2008, 206).   19
and the consequences for the international trading system of U.S. efforts to address those 
causes.  
As we describe in sections 5.1 and 5.2, a common view in the United States during both 
episodes was that inappropriate foreign government interference with market forces lay at the 
root of the imbalances.  This perception led naturally to U.S. efforts to use (and modify) the 
rules-based trading system to address the troubling imbalances in a systematic way. The 
differences in the bilateral imbalance that the United States faced with Japan versus its bilateral 
problem with China are found in the details. Finally, section 5.3 discusses some unintended 
consequences of the evolution of the trading system from the perspective of the United States—
in particular, how Japan and China have used the WTO dispute-settlement process to self-
enforce their exporters’ access to the U.S. market. 
5.1. U.S.-Japan conflict and the reach of WTO disciplines 
U.S. priorities in the Uruguay Round were shaped by dissatisfaction arising from U.S. exporters’ 
inability over several decades to access certain export markets, especially that of Japan.  This is 
clearly reflected in Table 5, which lists the exported products and disciplines at the heart of the 
formal actions (Section 301 and GATT disputes) the United States initiated against Japan 
during the 1977–1994 period.  
In the Uruguay Round, the United States sought to negotiate more rules and greater 
transparency, as well as extending disciplines in areas such as “standards” (including the 
Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade), 
government procurement, trade in services (GATS), subsidies (SCM Agreement), and 
intellectual property rights protection (TRIPS). All countries also had to accept new disciplines 
over trade in agriculture (subsidies and domestic support) as well as clothing and textiles 
through the phase-out of the MFA.    
We have already seen some of the results in the context of our discussion of WTO 
disputes brought by the United States against Japan since 1995 (Table 5), which put the new 
rules to the test. One example is a 1995 WTO dispute under the new TRIPS (Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement, in which the United States alleged that 
Japan was not sufficiently protecting the copyrights of U.S. musical artists for their past 
performances and sound recordings. The United States also quickly tested the reach of the new 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in the highly publicized 1995 Kodak-Fuji 
dispute, in which it alleged that Japanese government policies were the cause of Kodak’s 
inability to gain access to the Japanese market for photographic film and paper.  Finally, U.S. 
agricultural interests continued to play a role as the United States pursued standards cases 
under the new Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).  The United States   20
demanded that Japan remove burdensome import restrictions and testing requirements for 
various U.S. fruit exports, arguing that such trade barriers could not be justified on the basis of 
scientific risk assessments as required under the new WTO disciplines. 
5.2. U.S.-China conflict and the reach of WTO disciplines 
Perhaps the most fundamental issue raised by China’s entry is its legacy as a centrally planned 
economy.  Although industrial policy has now been decentralized to a significant extent, explicit 
and implicit subsidies remain an integral part of the nation’s industrial policy.  Under the terms of 
its accession agreement it is still accorded non-market-economy (NME) status, which in practice 
has translated into huge dumping margins and anti-dumping duties.  Along with remaining cash 
subsidies and tax rebates, China continues to provide financial support to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), easy access to loans for preferred companies and sectors, administrative 
guidance favoring FDI in preferred sectors, as well as persistent exchange-rate undervaluation 
(with the effect of protecting all domestic producers from competing imports and subsidizing all 
exporters). 
Current trade rules cover explicit cash subsidies and some tax rebates, but the protected 
status of SOEs and governmental discretion in the allocation of financial capital have parallels in 
the policies and practice of many other member countries.  WTO disciplines regarding trade-
related investment are weak at best, and the WTO has no explicit (actionable) mechanisms for 
dealing with a country’s manipulation of its exchange rate as an implicit means of favoring 
national firms over their foreign rivals in domestic or export markets. 
With the opportunity to negotiate the terms of China’s entry into the WTO, countries that 
had already attained membership were able to extract massive accession commitments from 
China.  These included commitments by China to scaling back explicit subsidies to SOEs and 
reforming the banking sector. However, given the self-enforcing nature of the WTO system, 
other members must enforce China’s commitment to reining in subsidies by initiating formal 
WTO complaints under the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Moreover, since 
there is no explicit WTO mechanism for dealing with the issue of implicit subsidization via 
currency undervaluation, even countries seeking to contest China’s explicit subsides through 
the DSU must resort to other policy options to confront the currency issue. 
WTO members have used two approaches to confront the China subsidy problem.  The 
first, used by the United States, is to initiate anti-subsidy disputes at the WTO (see Table 7). 
Through 2008, China has settled every WTO dispute over subsidies with a promise to remove 
the allegedly WTO-inconsistent measure.  The only exception is the “Famous Brands” case,   21
which was initiated only in December 2008.
41  The alternative way to contest China’s use of 
subsidies is for affected countries to facilitate use by their domestic firms of the country’s own 
countervailing duty law.  There is evidence (see Table 3) that WTO members including the 
United State are using this second route.  
5.3. New rules and the ability of Japan and China to self-enforce U.S. market access 
U.S. actions in the Uruguay Round also had an important influence on the negotiating positions 
of other countries. The new WTO Agreement on Safeguards banned the use of voluntary export 
restraints (VERs), an attempt to halt the proliferation of VERs that began in the 1960s and 
continued through the 1990s.
42  U.S. resort to “aggressive unilateralism” and retaliation threats 
through its increasingly active use of the Section 301 policy in the 1988–1994 period helped 
convince Japan and other U.S. trading partners to accept a more binding and legalistic system 
of dispute settlement, resulting in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).  
Table 8 shows how Japan has used WTO (and GATT) dispute settlement against the 
United States. While Japan rarely used formal dispute settlement against the United States 
during the GATT era, it has been much more active during the WTO period. The clear focus of 
Japan’s WTO trade dispute efforts has been on reforming U.S. use of antidumping. This is not 
surprising, given that Uruguay Round negotiators failed to agree on new rules to discipline use 
of antidumping.
43 Japan has filed disputes over U.S. imposition of antidumping measures on 
specific Japanese exports, e.g., hot rolled steel. Japan also challenged the little-used “other” 
U.S. antidumping law (Antidumping Act of 1916) as WTO-inconsistent because it allows for 
punitive damages beyond the imposition of ad valorem duties, and Japan joined the collective 
challenge to the U.S. Byrd Amendment, which required antidumping duties collected from 
                                                 
41 Perhaps in preparation for the possibility that the parties to a future dispute are unable to negotiate a 
settlement and the dispute goes to WTO adjudication, Chinese officials are becoming well informed on 
WTO rules and case law regarding subsidies and countervailing measures.  As Bown (forthcoming, Table 
10) indicates, China has been closely following the evolution of WTO rulings on subsidies in other 
countries’ disputes. As of early 2009, China had participated as an “interested third party” in over a dozen 
formal WTO disputes involving other countries’ subsidy issues. 
42 See the discussion in Bown (2002a). While VERs are banned under the Agreement on Safeguards, 
they are implicitly encouraged elsewhere in the WTO Agreements, e.g., through encouragement of “price 
undertakings” by targeted exporting firms in investigations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement. 
Moreover, because the WTO is a self-enforcing system, VERs can still be negotiated provided that no 
member complains.  Because in many instances the exporting country is better off under a VER than 
under the likely alternative (usually a higher import duty levied under some other policy), there may be no 
“party” (member) to complain.  Consumers of the affected imports and taxpayers in the importing country 
are likely to lose, but they have no direct standing in the WTO system. 
43 One consequence of the failure of the United States and other WTO members to address AD reform is 
that the use of AD has proliferated globally across the WTO membership.  Indeed, the most frequent 
users of antidumping are now developing countries, with other developing country exporters, especially 
China, a frequent target.   22
foreign firms to be refunded to the domestic U.S. firms behind the antidumping petition.  Japan 
has also challenged the Department of Commerce’s use of “zeroing” to inflate dumping margins 
and thus justify higher antidumping duties.
44  Finally, Japan challenged the way in which the 
United States conducts its “sunset reviews.” These reviews are supposed to lead to the removal 
of the imposed antidumping duties after five years, but in most instances U.S. duties have 
remained in place well beyond the five-year limit. 
Table 8 indicates that China has also been using WTO dispute settlement as a 
complainant since its accession.  China’s approach been similar to that of Japan, but its activity 
has been more limited. On the complainant side, China’s only involvement in a formal dispute 
prior to 2007 was the challenge it joined with Japan, the EC, and six other WTO members 
seeking removal of the steel safeguard import restrictions imposed by the United States in 2002.  
Since 2007, however, China has begun to challenge U.S. use of antidumping and 
countervailing duty policies. The first dispute China initiated against the United States (after the 
imposition of a preliminary duty) became moot after the USITC found no evidence of injury, and 
so no final duties were imposed, as discussed section 3.3 above. But in response to increasing 
U.S. antidumping activity (Figures 2 and 3b) and the new U.S. stance on countervailing duty use 
(Table 3), in 2008 China initiated a challenge to the U.S. laws in the first four instances in which 
China’s exporters were targeted with U.S. CVD.  In April 2009, China initiated its first challenge 
to trade barriers over a standards issue, questioning whether the U.S. ban on poultry imports 
from China could be justified scientifically. 
6. Macroeconomic roots of trade frictions 
In previous sections we have focused mainly on U.S. trade policy responses at the industry or 
product level, and also U.S. efforts to address certain systemic features of the partner economy, 
especially industrial policy and exchange-rate undervaluation, that are widely believed to confer 
an artificial competitive advantage relative to U.S. firms.  In this section, we examine the trade 
imbalances from a macroeconomic perspective, and we indicate similarities and differences for 
the cases of Japan and China.  Insights from the macroeconomic roots of the imbalance help to 
explain how imbalance episodes develop and also why they end. 
The macroeconomic analysis begins from the accounting identity that a nation’s current-
account balance must be equal to the difference between the nation’s saving and its domestic 
investment.
45  Equivalently, a nation’s current-account balance must be equal to the difference 
                                                 
44 Bown and Sykes (2008) provide a discussion of zeroing. 
45 The current-account balance is the balance on goods and services trade plus net earnings of factors 
employed abroad plus net unilateral transfers.  In a very simple world of barter trade in which exports and 
imports of goods and services are the only international transactions, the trade balance is the same as   23
between its domestic production and its total domestic spending for goods and services—
consumption, domestic investment, and government.  Any shortfall must be matched by an 
equal net capital inflow from abroad.  Roughly speaking, the country’s ability to “live beyond its 
means” in a particular year must be financed through borrowing from abroad.
46 Likewise, a 
country with a current-account surplus must have saving that exceeds its domestic investment 
and thus makes a net addition to national holdings of foreign assets.   
An identity is simply a relationship that must hold at all times; it is not a theory that 
relates cause and effect.  In practice, many economic variables can adjust simultaneously to 
maintain the relationship described by the identity.  These include not only the components of 
the identity but also variables that influence them, such as interest rates, exchange rates, and 
capital-market development.  Moreover, if a new policy changes one variable directly, other 
induced changes may offset its impact.  For example, if a country attempts to improve its trade 
balance only by raising all tariffs on imports, thus reducing imports, induced changes might 
include an exchange-rate appreciation, which would in turn encourage imports and reduce 
exports.  But the identity does show how the external imbalance relates to aggregates in the 
domestic economy, and particularly national saving.  No set of policies can reduce the U.S. 
current-account deficit unless they result in higher national saving, lower domestic investment, 
or both.
47   
A country’s saving consists of two parts: private saving and government (public) saving; 
government saving is equal to the fiscal surplus or deficit.  Private saving in turn consists of 
household saving and corporate saving.  This decomposition is significant because the growth 
of U.S. current-account and trade deficits have occurred in tandem with rapid declines in U.S. 
national saving. But although U.S. saving dropped during both periods of bilateral conflict, the 
causes of the two drops were different.
48  In the 1980s, the growth of the U.S. bilateral trade 
deficit with Japan occurred during a period when the federal budget deficit was also growing, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the current-account balance.  In practice, movements in the U.S. merchandise trade balance (our main 
focus elsewhere in this paper) are closely linked to movements in the current account. 
46 More precisely, foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets in that year must exceed U.S. residents’ acquisitions 
of foreign assets.   However, equities and similar ownership claims do not reflect borrowing and lending.  
For example, “foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets” can include greenfield construction of new foreign-
owned manufacturing facilities in the United States or sale of an interest in an existing U.S. business to 
foreign investors.  The statement may also be misleading in implying that it is international borrowing that 
must adjust to cover the gap between domestic production and domestic demand for goods and services. 
47  See McCulloch (1990) on the macroeconomic roots of the U.S.-Japan current account imbalance in the 
1980s.  Ito (2009) compares the U.S.-Japan imbalance of the 1980s with the U.S.-China imbalance in the 
2000s.  His empirical analysis confirms a significant causal role of budget balances in determining 
current-account imbalances.  However, he also concludes that the Japanese current-account surpluses of 
the 1980s were driven by underperformance of investment rather than over-saving. 
 
48 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 5.1, shows the 
decomposition for each quarter of U.S. saving into private saving and government saving.   24
i.e., government saving was falling. This is the situation often described as the “twin deficits.”  
However, the ballooning U.S.-China trade imbalances since the late 1990s have been 
associated with a steep decline in U.S. private saving, as well as a return to a substantial fiscal 
deficit that began only in 2002.  In 2008, a large federal deficit together with negative gross 
private saving produced a drop in U.S. gross saving to 11.9% of GNP, compared with around 
20% at the start of the 1980s and a peak of 18.2% as recently as 1998.  
Throughout the paper, we have focused on bilateral imbalances.  In a world of many 
countries, a U.S. saving-investment gap must be matched by a U.S. current-account deficit with 
the rest of the world as a whole.  Since the early 1990s, the United States has had a deficit on 
goods trade with most global regions, not only with Japan and China (see Figure 5).  Mann 
(2004) terms the alignment of U.S. and foreign structural characteristics and policy choices 
during this period “global co-dependency”—with the United States increasingly serving as a 
“buyer of last resort” for producers throughout the world.
49   How the resulting overall U.S. trade 
deficit is divided across particular trading partners depends on other countries’ own 
macroeconomic relationships, as well as the countries’ exchange rates relative to the dollar and 
comparative advantages relative to the United States.  A necessary condition for a large 
bilateral deficit is a saving shortfall relative to domestic investment in the United States together 
with a corresponding savings surplus in the partner country.  Both Japan and China (as well as 
smaller East Asian countries) have high saving rates, and both have overall current-account 
surpluses, i.e., they are net purchasers of foreign assets.  Thus, we can also think of a given 
partner’s net saving financing U.S. spending (private or government) through purchases of U.S. 
assets.  In fact, both Japan and China have accumulated large quantities of U.S. assets, 
including but not limited to U.S. government securities, in both cases helping to maintain a 
currency that many considered “undervalued” relative to the dollar.   
One interesting comparison that cannot yet be completed concerns the ends of the two 
episodes.  Japan-bashing was moderated by the rapid appreciation of the yen relative to the 
dollar that began in 1985 and slowed to a crawl during Japan’s “lost decade” in the 1990s.  
Although Japan’s overall trade surplus persisted, its share in the overall U.S. trade deficit 
peaked in 1991 at about 66% and fell subsequently; by 2008, U.S.-Japan trade accounted for 
only about 8% of the overall U.S. merchandise trade deficit.  In part, this shift reflects the 
relocation of some production for the U.S. market from Japan to China (including Hong Kong, 
which reverted to Chinese control in 1997), with Japanese multinationals exporting intermediate 
                                                 
49 For a complete discussion, see Mann (2002, 2004).  Mann (2004), writing during a period of dollar 
depreciation, uses the term “co-dependency” to describe the complementary domestic macroeconomic 
imbalances and emphasizes that currency realignments alone cannot correct the U.S. external 
imbalance.     25
parts to their Chinese subsidiaries and a large share of the final output exported from China to 
the United States.
50 
In a prescient discussion of a U.S. external imbalance that was already massive and still 
rising in 2004, Mann (2004) writes, “There is a real possibility that the entanglements created by 
this co-dependency cannot be undone by anything short of a global economic crisis.” Indeed, 
the global recession that began in 2008 did reduce the saving/investment imbalances 
underlying the huge overall U.S. trade deficit and the bilateral trade deficit with China.  U.S. 
gross saving as a share of GNP reached a minimum in the second quarter of 2008 and then 
trended upward, while gross domestic investment began to fall in the third quarter.  Although 
both imports and exports fell, exports fell by less; the U.S. trade and current-account deficits 
both narrowed in early 2009.      
Meanwhile, slow or even negative growth of income in most countries worldwide caused 
demand for Chinese exports to fall sharply.  To maintain the pace of its economic growth, 
Chinese policy makers implemented a major domestic stimulus, and saving fell relative to 
investment.  In early 2009, China’s trade surplus also fell from the record level attained in 2008.   
Accordingly, China’s international reserves grew more slowly than in recent years. China sold a 
substantial volume of U.S. Treasury securities and other foreign bonds in early 2009 before 
resuming purchases in March. 
7. Conclusions 
A goal of this paper is to provide a framework that allows us to make sense of the U.S.-Japan 
and U.S.-China trade relationships over the past thirty years, seeing similarities and differences 
as well as implications for evolution of the rules-based GATT/WTO system.  The central 
similarity in the two bilateral relationships is the huge bilateral trade imbalance, a reflection of 
the outward-oriented growth strategy followed by Japan and China but also of underlying 
macroeconomic conditions.  In both cases, the result has been a strain on the reciprocity-based 
trading system.  We have looked at the imbalance as the result of exports that grew “too fast” 
from the U.S. perspective and imports that grew “too slowly.” In both cases, the U.S. public and 
government officials chose to interpret the imbalance as a symptom of non-market 
considerations;  in both cases, the official response included both policies that addressed the 
symptoms as well as efforts to remedy features of the partner economy that were perceived as 
underlying causes.  But in both cases the U.S. public and government officials were slow to 
                                                 
50 The full export price of these goods is reflected in the statistics on U.S.-China trade even when Chinese 
value-added is only a fraction of this price.     26
acknowledge an underlying cause at home: the very low U.S. saving rate and a resulting 
domestic macroeconomic imbalance that translated into a large external imbalance.
51   
On the import side, the two cases are similar in the U.S. resort to VERs and 
antidumping, as well as negotiation of preferential agreements with traditional suppliers of 
relevant imported products.  One difference is that the United States has recently begun using 
countervailing duties against China, an approach it did not take with Japan.  Another difference 
is the use of the China-specific safeguards negotiated when China joined the WTO. 
On the export side, use of U.S. Section 301 and GATT dispute settlement against Japan 
in the 1977–1994 period looks similar to the use of WTO dispute settlement against China since 
2006.  Differences are more subtle; consistent with a political-economy perspective, U.S. efforts 
in both cases reflected dominant export interests at the time.  In the case of Japan, the role of 
keiretsu and active industrial policy were seen as an important part of the problem.  In the case 
of China, the legacy of a non-market system has remained an issue, even though an increasing 
share of import-competing products and exports has come from parts of the economy where 
private ownership and market forces are strong. 
U.S. frustration with its lack of success in prying open the Japanese market led to new 
rules introduced into the WTO system (SPS, TBT, Government Procurement, Information 
Technology, TRIPS, Agriculture) in the Uruguay Round negotiations.  The most important 
change, however, was the introduction of a new system of dispute resolution with “teeth,” 
though this required the United States to modify the aggressive unilateralism that had 
characterized its approach to trade policy in the pre-WTO period.  As we have noted, no 
progress has been made on antidumping, although the improved dispute-settlement system 
may help to address this problem over time.   
Looking ahead to new issues, prospects for global negotiations are now dominated by 
two issues that overshadow the ones that constituted the Doha Round agenda as well as others 
that have vied for public attention most recently (e.g., contaminated foods, unsafe toys). One 
major new issue is the global recession, with the associated decline in the volume of world trade 
and the rise of new protectionism.  The second is climate change and the trade-policy 
implications of efforts to limit carbon emissions—and to deal with “carbon leakage” from 
countries not willing to join in these efforts.  China in particular has already been the major 
target of a surge of WTO-legal administered protection and is likely also to be a major target of 
                                                 
51 The official position of the United States may be shifting toward greater acceptance of the role of U.S. 
macro policy in sustaining the imbalance. In a major speech at Beijing University on June 1, 2009, U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner explicitly acknowledged the need for the United States to increase 
private saving and reduce the fiscal deficit.  Similar to many past public pronouncements of U.S. officials, 
he also called for China to shift away from export-driven growth by strengthening domestic demand.     27
efforts to penalize imports from countries that do not sign on to new multilateral arrangements 
on carbon emissions.
52   
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Table 1 
Points of comparison: Japan (1970s–1980s) and China (1990–2000s) 
Similarities 
High saving rate 
Export-oriented growth strategy 
Large domestic market 
Large bilateral trade surplus with United States 
Large share of world exports 
Allegations of unfair trade and dumping 
Industrial policy, subsidies to preferred industries 
Export concentration by industry 
Exchange rate undervaluation 
Large official and private holdings of U.S. government securities 
Host-country scrutiny of outward FDI 
Lack of transparency 
Differences 
Per capita income (about $3,000 for China in 2007; a substantial fraction of population living 
below $2 per day) 
Major role of agricultural reforms (China) 
Openness to manufactured imports (China) 
Special Economic Zones (China) 
Large global trade surplus (Japan) 
Key role of inward foreign direct investment (China) 
Mode of technology transfer  
Enforcement of intellectual property rights 
Participation in vertical specialization  
Centralization of industrial policy (Japan) 
Industrial organization (Japan’s keiretsu) 
Direct competition with U.S. exports (Japan)        
Role in U.S. security (Japan)                                    31
Table 2 













          
1.  SG  Stainless steel and alloy tool steel  1975  201-TA-5  1976 
2. SG  Footwear  1975  201-TA-7  1976 
3. SG  Footwear  1976  201-TA-18  1977 
4. SG  Television  receivers  1976  201-TA-19  1977 
5.  SG  Certain motor vehicles and 
chassis/bodies therefor 
1980 201-TA-44  1981 
6.  SG  Carbon and certain alloy steel 
products 
1984 201-TA-51  1984 
7.  AD  EPROMS (Erasable programmable 
read-only memory – semiconductors) 
1985 731-TA-288  1986 
8.  AD  256K and above DRAMS (Dynamic 
random access memory – 
semiconductors) 
1985 731-TA-300  1986 
9.  AD  Photo paper and chemicals  1993  731-TA-661  1994 
10. AD  Sodium  azide  1996  731-TA-740  1997 
          
 
Sources: Data collected by the authors from various USITC publications. 
Notes: SG refers to a safeguard under the U.S. Section 201 law; AD refers to antidumping 
under the U.S. Section 731 law.   32
Table 3 








      
1.  Coated free sheet paper  2006  0.00  
(no injury) 
2.  Circular welded carbon quality steel pipe  2007  37.28 
3.  Certain new pneumatic off-the-road tires  2007  5.62 
4.  Light-walled rectangular pipe and tube  2007  15.28 
5.  Laminated woven sacks  2007  226.85 
6. Lightweight  thermal  paper  2007  13.63 
7.  Raw flexible magnets  2007  109.95 
8. Sodium  nitrite  2007  169.01 
9.  Circular welded austenitic stainless pressure pipe  2008  1.01 
10.  Circular welded carbon quality steel line pipe  2008  35.67 
11.  Citric acid and certain citrate salts  2008  na** 
12.  Certain tow-behind lawn groomers and certain parts 
thereof 
2008 na** 
13.  Certain kitchen appliance shelving and racks  2008  na** 
14.  Oil country tubular goods  2009            na 
      
 
Source: Bown (2009a). 
Notes: *data as of 15 April 2009. The entry na indicates final determination not yet available, ** 
indicates that a preliminary CVD was imposed after a preliminary determination of injury and 
subsidization. 
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Table 4 








Initiated CSG  Outcome 
Subsequent 
Resort to AD or 
CVD? 
        
TA-421-1  Pedestal actuators  2002  Affirmative ITC vote, 
no CSG remedy 
imposed 
No 
TA-421-2  Steel wire garment 
hangers 
2002  Affirmative ITC vote, 





AD measures  
TA-421-3  Brake drums and 
rotors 
2003  Negative ITC vote  No* 
TA-421-4 Ductile  iron 
waterworks fittings 
2003  Affirmative ITC vote, 





2004  Negative ITC vote  2008 AD 
investigation, 
2009 definitive 
AD measures  
TA-421-6 Circular  welded 
non-alloy steel Pipe 
2005  Affirmative ITC vote, 







TA-421-7 Certain  passenger 
vehicle and light 
truck tires 
2009  Affirmative ITC vote, 
President imposed 
35% tariff on China 
as remedy 
No 
        
 
Notes: Information collected by the authors and compiled in Bown (2009a), current as of 28 
September 2009. AD is antidumping, CVD is countervailing duty.  
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Table 5 
U.S. Section 301 investigations targeting Japan’s import market access, GATT and WTO 
disputes, 1955–2008 
 






       
1.  Steel – Japan/EC agreement “deflected” Japanese production to the 
U.S. market 
1976 Y  N 
2.  Thrown silk – discriminatory market access agreement with Brazil, 
Korea, China 
1977 Y  Y 
3.  Leather – quantitative import restrictions and high tariffs  1977  Y  Y 
4.  Cigars – import barriers and discriminatory internal taxes  1979  Y  Y 
5.  Pipe tobacco – high import prices and limits on distribution and 
advertising 
1979 Y  Y 
6.  Leather footwear – quantitative import restrictions  1982  Y  Y 
7.  Metal softball bats – technical barrier to trade of discriminatory 
testing/certification  
1982 N  Y** 
8.  Single tendering procedures – general practices of government 
procurement 
1984 N  Y 
9.  Semiconductors – domestic policies created “protective structure” and 
market access barrier  
1985 Y  N† 
10.  Cigarettes – high tariffs, domestic monopoly, distribution restrictions  1985  Y  N 
11.  Certain agricultural products – quantitative import restrictions on 
dairy, legumes, starches, sugars, groundnuts, preserved beef, fruit 
pastes and juices, pineapple, tomato 
1986 N  Y 
12.  Herring, pollack, and surimi – quantitative import restriction on fish  1986  N  Y 
13.  Citrus - import quotas on fresh oranges and juice, domestic content 
requirements 
1988 Y  Y 
14.  Construction services - barriers to foreign architectural, engineering, 
consulting services 
1988 Y  N 
15.  Beef – quantitative restrictions on imports  1988  N  Y 
16.  Satellites – ban on government procurement of imports  1989  Y  N 
17.  Supercomputers – restrictive government procurement practices of 
imports 
1989 Y  N 
18.  Wood products – technical barriers to trade (product standards, 
building codes, testing and certification) affecting imports 
1989 Y  N 
19.  Auto parts – policies that restrict foreign access to replacement parts 
market 
1994 Y  N† 
20.  Alcoholic beverages – Japanese “shochu” taxed internally at a lower 
rate than comparable imported products (vodka, liqueurs, gin, genever, 
rum, whisky, brandy) 
1995 N  Y 
21.  Sound recording measures – copyright law provides insufficient 
duration of intellectual property rights protection for past performances 
and sound recordings 
1995 N  Y   35
22.  Consumer photographic film and paper – discriminatory policies 
inhibit sale and distribution of foreign products 
1995 Y  Y 
23.  Agricultural products – “codling moth” testing requirement results in 
import ban of apricots, cherries, plums, pears, quince, peaches, 
nectarines, apples, walnuts 
1997 Y  Y 
24.  Apples – import restrictions due to risk of transmitting “fire blight” 
bacterium 
2002 N  Y 
       
 
Sources: Compiled by the authors from WTO (1995, 2009), Bayard and Elliott (1994, Appendix 
Table and 355-465), and USTR (2009, various years).  
 
Notes: *Earliest year of initiation of formal Section 301 petition or GATT/WTO dispute. **Not a 
GATT dispute initiated under Article XXIII, but a dispute documented in Hudec (1993). †U.S. 
retaliation or threatened retaliation led to Japan filing a GATT/WTO trade dispute against the 
U.S.    36
Table 6 
Applied tariffs and bindings for selected WTO members, 2007 
 












        
United States  All  100  3.5  3.5 
 Agriculture  na  5.0  5.5 
 Non-agriculture  100  3.3  3.2 
 Clothing  100  11.4  11.7 
        
Japan All  99.6  5.1  5.1 
 Agriculture  na  22.7  21.8 
 Non-agriculture  99.6  2.4  2.6 
 Clothing  100  9.2  9.2 
        
China All  100  10.0  9.9 
 Agriculture  na  15.8  15.8 
 Non-agriculture  100  9.1  9.0 
 Clothing  100  16.2  16.0 
        
Brazil All  100  31.4  12.2 
 Agriculture  na  35.5  10.3 
 Non-agriculture  100  30.8  12.5 
 Clothing  100  35.0  20.0 
        
India All  73.8  50.2  14.5 
 Agriculture  na  114.2  34.4 
 Non-agriculture  69.8  38.2  11.5 
 Clothing  54.9  43.5  22.2 
        
 
Source: Compiled by the authors from WTO (2008c). 
Notes: The entry na indicates not available. Binding coverage is defined as share of HS 
six-digit subheadings containing at least one bound tariff line. Simple averages are of the 
ad valorem (ad valorem equivalent) six-digit HS duty averages.   
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Table 7 
U.S.-initiated WTO trade disputes over access to China’s import market, 2001–2008 
 
No.  Product/Policy – Complainant(s) and Issue  Year  
    
1.  Integrated circuits – U.S. alleged that China’s domestic value-added tax and 
rebate scheme violated national treatment thus discriminating against imports 
2004 
2.  Automobile parts – U.S., EC, and Canada alleged that China’s policies violated 
rules on national treatment and subsidies and created disincentives for domestic 
auto manufactures to use imported parts 
2006 
3.  Refunds, reductions or exemptions from taxes and other payments –  U.S. 
and Mexico alleged that China’s policies granted WTO-inconsistent subsidies 
granted if firms purchased domestic over imported goods or on the condition that 
firms meet export criterion 
2007 
4.  Movies, music, publications  (IPR Enforcement) – U.S. alleged that China was 
in violation of TRIPS because its laws failed to sufficiently enforce the intellectual 
property rights of foreign-produced movies, sound recordings and other 
publications 
2007 
5.  Movies, music, publications  (Distribution) – U.S. alleged that China was in 
violation of GATS for barriers to the distribution of foreign-produced movies 
(theatrical release or home entertainment), sound recordings and other 
publications 
2007 
6.  Financial information services and foreign financial information suppliers  – 
U.S., EC, and Canada alleged that China’s policies which require foreign financial 
information suppliers (e.g., Bloomberg, Thomson-Reuters, Dow-Jones, Pearson) 
to supply their services through an entity designated by Xinhua News Agency 
discriminates against imports 
2008 
7.  “Famous Brands”  – U.S., Mexico, and Guatemala alleged that policies such as 
“China World Top Brand Programme” and the “Chinese Famous Export Brand 
Programme” allocate subsidies based on export performance criterion and are 
thus in violation of the SCM Agreement 
2008 
    
 
Source: Compiled by the authors from WTO (2009).  
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Table 8 
Japan and China use of GATT and WTO dispute settlement to challenge the United States, 1955-
2009* 
 
No.  Product/Policy – Complainant(s) and Issue  Year 
    
1.  Countervailing duty calculation (“Zenith Case”)**† – Japan alleged as GATT-
inconsistent the U.S. procedure for calculating subsidies during countervailing 
duty investigations in a way that penalizes trading partner exemption of exporters 
from indirect taxes (e.g., VAT schemes) 
1977 
2.  Semiconductor retaliation* – Japan alleged that the U.S. violated GATT 
obligations by unilaterally raising tariffs against Japan’s exports in a disagreement 
over whether Japan was abiding by the 1986 bilateral semiconductor agreement 
1987 
3.  Section 301 import duties on autos – Japan alleged as WTO-inconsistent the 
proposed U.S. retaliation during the U.S. Section 301 investigation of Japan’s 
market access for foreign auto parts 
1995 
4.  Government procurement – Japan and EC alleged as a WTO violation of the 
Government Procurement Act the Massachusetts “Burma Act” legislation banning 
the state government from purchasing from persons who do business with Burma  
1997 
5.  AD Act of 1916 – Japan and the EC alleged that the U.S. Antidumping Act of 
1916 was WTO-inconsistent as it allowed for imposition of penalties beyond the 
imposition of duties allowed by the Agreement on Antidumping and thus had a 
“chilling effect” on exporters 
1999 
6.  AD on hot-rolled steel – Japan alleged that the U.S. violated obligations by 
imposing WTO-inconsistent antidumping duties on hot rolled steel products  
1999 
7.  Byrd Amendment – Japan, the EC, and nine other countries alleged the U.S. 
“Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000” policy of refunding to 
domestic petitioners the collected foreign duties after affirmative antidumping and 
countervailing duty investigations was a WTO-inconsistent subsidy 
2000 
8.  Sunset review of AD on steel – Japan alleged as WTO-inconsistent the U.S. 
procedure for conducting a “sunset review” for removing antidumping duties on 
imports of corrosion-resistant steel 
2002 
9.  Steel safeguards – China, Japan, the EC, and six other countries alleged as 
WTO-inconsistent the 2002 U.S. imposition of an import safeguard on a variety of 
steel products 
2002 
10.  Zeroing – Japan alleged as WTO-inconsistent the U.S. procedure of using the 
method of “zeroing” (giving a value of zero for data on above-normal-value sales 
instead of the positive value) in dumping margin calculations at various stages of 
the antidumping investigation and review process  
2004 
11.  Coated free sheet paper AD/CVD – China alleged as WTO-inconsistent the 
preliminary antidumping and countervailing duties the U.S. imposed on imports 
2007 
12.  Certain products AD/CVD – China alleged as WTO-inconsistent U.S. 
antidumping and countervailing duties imposed on imports of “Circular Welded 
Carbon Quality Steel Pipe,” “Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires,” “Light-
Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube,” and “Laminated Woven Sacks.” 
2008 
13.  Chicken import ban – China alleged as a WTO-inconsistent standards (SPS) 
violation the U.S. policy banning imports of poultry from China 
2009 
 
Sources: Compiled by the authors from WTO (1995, 2009) and Hudec (1993). 
Notes: *WTO disputes initiated through April 28, 2009. **Dispute under the GATT; all other 
disputes took place under the WTO. †Not a formal Article XXIII dispute, but found in Hudec 
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Figure 1.  Shares of total U.S. trade deficit, 1989–2007: China, Japan, and other East Asia 
Sources: Constructed by the authors from USITC Dataweb. 
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Figure 2. U.S. antidumping activity against Japan and China, 1979–2008 
Source: Compiled by the authors from Bown (2009a). 
Note: Count is number of antidumping investigations initiated during those years that resulted in 
the imposition of final antidumping measures. 
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Figure 3. The U.S. bilateral trade deficits and use of antidumping 
Sources: Antidumping data compiled by the authors from Bown (2009a). U.S.-Japan bilateral 
trade data are from Feenstra et al. (2005). U.S.-China bilateral trade data are from USITC 
Dataweb. 
Note:  Light bars indicate number of antidumping investigations initiated during those years that 
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Figure 4. The U.S.-Japan bilateral trade deficit and U.S. Section 301, GATT, and WTO formal 
trade dispute activity against Japan, 1965–2000 
Sources: Section 301, GATT, and WTO dispute initiation data compiled by the authors as 
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Figure 5.  Composition of U.S. trade deficit, 1989–2007, by region 
Source: Constructed by the authors from USITC Dataweb. 
Note: Bilateral trade deficit defined from series U.S. General Imports – U.S. Total Exports. 
 
 
  